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Abstract 
This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of 
cross-selling and switching costs during 1993-2008. It presents estimates of a model of 
banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-
balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model lends support to 
our theoretical priors on the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the 
rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades. We also find that the 
consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, 
as a result of lower competitiveness. 
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I. Introduction 
The global financial crisis that broke out in 2007 has resulted in momentous changes to 
banking in the UK. The initial changes included the hastily approved acquisition of HBOS by 
the Lloyds group in 2009; the injection of state capital into Lloyds and Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) which resulted in 40% and 80% public ownership of the two banks, 
respectively; and the wholesale nationalisation of Northern Rock. Indeed, recently the 
Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), set up in 2010, has placed British banking in the 
spotlight. The ICB Interim Report (2011) identifies switching costs and barriers to entry as 
key elements in the weakened state of competitiveness in British banking, with adverse 
implications for consumer welfare. However, there is a gap in empirical research such that 
there is no evidence on how banking competitiveness has impacted on cross-selling and 
switching costs in the UK. 
 This paper seeks to fill the gap in empirical work, motivated by the ICB Interim 
Report (2011), by evaluating the competitiveness of British banking in the context of cross-
selling and switching costs during 1993-2008
1
. The evaluation is conducted by estimating 
and testing an empirical model of bank behaviour in the presence of switching costs and 
where there is contemporaneous cross-selling of loans against off-balance sheet business 
(OBS) but the loan decision is intertemporal. The results suggest that as a result of weakening 
competition in the loan market, the banking consumer faced higher switching costs and 
higher lock-in of bank services in the latter part of the sample period. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents a review of 
recent developments in British banking and the relevant literature on switching costs and 
                                                          
1
 We define cross-selling as the sale of a core good or service that induces an opportunity for sale of a follow-on 
good or service, while switching costs refer to the costs borne by the consumer associated with cross-selling of 
the core product over multiple periods. Hence, while cross-selling may be static, switching costs invariably 
involve a dynamic process. 
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cross-selling. The theoretical framework and derivation of the empirical model are outlined in 
Section III. The data and variables used in estimation and testing are discussed in Section IV 
and the results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes. 
II. British Banking 1993 - 2008  
The period of deregulation in British banking, in the 1980s, was followed by two decades of 
demutualisation of Building Societies and a spate of bank mergers and acquisitions. The 
Lloyds and TSB merger occurred in 1995, Bristol and West was acquired by Bank of Ireland 
in 1997, Woolwich was acquired by Barclays in 2000, NatWest merged with Royal Bank of 
Scotland in 2000, and Halifax and Bank of Scotland merged in 2001. There are some specific 
examples where during the 1990s demutualisation simply gave way to acquisition. The 
examples include acquisition of National and Provincial by Abbey National in 1996, 
Cheltenham and Gloucester by Lloyds in 1995, and Leeds Permanent by Halifax in 1995
2
. 
The result was a tendency towards concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) for total assets. As shown in Figure 1, the high HHI levels recorded during 
2005-2008 suggest anti-competitive practice in the loan market in British banking during the 
period
3
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Ashton and Pham (2007) list 61 M&A activities between banks and Building Societies during 1988-2006. 
3
 According to the current screening guidelines of the US Department of Justice, the banking industry is 
regarded as competitive if HHI is less than 1000, somewhat concentrated if HHI lies between 1000 and 1800, 
and highly concentrated if HHI is larger than 1800.  
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Figure 1: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the Loan Market in UK Banking 
 
 
Source: Bankscope, Annual Reports and Author calculation 
 
Also, the latter half of the 2000s witnessed a record number of bank customer 
complaints to the Financial Ombudsman
4
. The occurrence of these complaints is consistent 
with the empirical findings by Matthews et al (2007), which showed worsening of 
competitiveness in British banking during the 1993-2005 periods in terms of supply of other 
financial services rather than lending and deposit taking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The Guardian Newspaper 14 September 2010. 
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Figure 2 : Non-interest income ratio for UK banking 
 
Source: Bankscope, Annual Reports and Author calculation 
  
  
It may be argued that deregulation of the British banking system has led to the growth of non-
interest earning business and off-balance sheet services. Figure 2 shows the evolution of non-
interest earnings as a proportion of total operating income by the British banks since 1993. It 
is shown that non-interest income reached a peak of nearly 59% of gross income in 2006, fell 
slightly in 2007 to 54% and then plummeted to 36% in the depth of the banking crisis of 
2008.  Hence, following deregulation, the growth of non-interest earning business and off-
balance sheet services occurred during 1998-2005 and was checked by the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis. 
Banks have developed a strategy of providing a bundled product (Llewellyn, 2005). 
Arguably, such a strategy offers the banks increased scope for locking-in of the consumer, 
which specifically amounts to retention of their consumers, and therefore facilitates banks’ 
cross-selling across products. Limited competition in the lending market may lock-in the 
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bank consumers’ demand for loans as well as their demand for other financial services, where 
the purchase of one bank service may be conditional on the purchase of another, which may 
deter the customers from searching for the best individual product.. 
 Previous research has found that switching costs and cross-selling have an impact on 
the pricing strategy of suppliers and competitiveness in the market place (Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2006). In addition to the repeat-purchase of identical good over periods in the 
case of single product producers, an additional dimension that influences the pricing strategy 
of the multiple product firms is contemporaneous selling of the follow-on goods (i.e. cross-
selling). The underlying implication is that the holding-up problem as the result of switching 
cost has dynamic and cross-section static dimension for multiple product firms. With respect 
to the former, producers compete on the lifecycle prices of the identical goods; a supplier 
prices low if they recognise that their current market share would be helpful in holding on to 
their existing customers in the future.  The lower price in the current period can be viewed as 
front-loaded compensation, where the producer uses the current price as a loss-leader. Such a 
strategy can work if only the producer can effectively transform rent across periods. The 
strength of the “lock-in” effect in the future determines the “market share” competition in the 
present and reflects the pricing behaviour. The increase in the value of the market share that 
would be locked into the future would enhance supplier’s incentive to carry out such a 
strategy. With respect to the latter, producers compete on the bundle of products; multi-
product producers advertise their loss-leader core products but expect consumers who buy 
their advertised products to buy other products too (Farrell and Klemperer, 2006). A supplier 
reduces price of the core product than it would be if the supplier perceives the value of 
transforming rent across products. Again, the likelihood of cross-selling other products to 
recoup cost of the loss-leader core product would lead to the change in the producer’s 
strategy. Such a strategy can work if only the producer can effectively transform rent across 
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products. Taking into account those two dimensions, switching costs and cross-selling offer a 
means for suppliers to design a pricing strategy to a particular customer not just for a single 
product but for a bundle of products, for multiple periods. The pricing behaviour of multiple 
product firms motivated by the overall profit maximization over the long-term relationship 
with their consumers has a bearing on the intrinsic inter-temporal pricing of suppliers and 
also predicts the contemporaneous cross-subsidization across different products (Ausubel, 
1991; Stango, 1998).  
 The literature on switching costs and cross-selling in banking is sparse (Li et al., 
2005).  Empirical studies on cross-selling of commercial banks attempt to address the 
incentives and outcomes of commercial banks to offer concurrent lending and investment-
banking services within the context of relationship banking.  The general finding derived 
from the literature is that banks price loans and underwriting services in a strategic way so as 
to gain competitive advantage and extract value through their relationship with their 
consumers (Laux and Walz, 2009; Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 2009). With respect to 
switching costs, Sharpe (1997) tests for the effects of switching costs on the pricing 
behaviour of banks in the retail deposit market in the US. The research shows that the retail 
deposit rate is positively related to household in-migration, which is consistent with the idea 
that the faster growing market enhances the value of the current market share in the future 
and incentivises banks to set interest rates that are more attractive to new consumers. A 
similar result is confirmed by Hannan et al., (2003) and Hannan (2008). Shy (2002) uses an 
undercut-proof equilibrium model to estimate switching cost in the market for deposits in 
Finland and suggests that switching costs could be as high as 11% of the average balance of 
deposit account. Kim et al. (2003) develop an empirical model which fits data to directly 
estimate the magnitude and significance of the switching cost. Kim et al (2003) apply a 
transition probability model of switching providers in the market for bank loans to the 
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Norwegian banking industry over the period 1988 to 1996
5
. It is found that switching costs 
are about one-third of the average interest rate on loans, which suggests creation of a 
significant lock-in of bank consumers. The principal aim of this paper is to accommodate the 
multiple-production characteristics of banks in the theoretical framework set up in Kim et al 
(2003)
6
 to evaluate the development of competitiveness in British banking as a result of 
cross-selling and switching costs. 
III. The Theoretical Model 
Kim et al. (2003) provides the theoretical framework for the presence of switching costs for 
loans across time
7
. Consider n banks competing in a given lending market, with different 
interest rates on loans. The consumers (i.e. borrowers) are assumed to have an imperfectly 
elastic demand for loans
8
. Each consumer borrows a quantity of loans in each of the infinite 
discrete periods. The borrower maximizes his utility by choosing a bank, taking into account 
the interest rate on loans charged by all banks in the market. Borrowers are allowed to switch 
among banks in any period. However, switching is costly; the magnitude of the switching 
cost is common knowledge to banks and borrowers. The probability of switching (i.e. 
transition probability
9
), is a function of the interest rate on loans and switching costs. The 
demand for loans faced by each bank can be derived by aggregating the transition 
probabilities over all borrowers even if the switching decision is not observable. The changes 
in the market share of each bank across time are partly driven by borrowers’ switching.  
                                                          
5
 Arguably, the switching cost faced by a borrower in the lending market would be non-negligible due to the 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers face switching cost when they change to a 
new lender since they are informationally captured by the existing lender (Sharp, 1990). Due to switching costs, 
products which are homogenous ex ante become heterogeneous ex post (Klemperer, 1995). 
6
 A salient merit of the model in Kim et al. (2003) is that it provides a plausible theoretical underpinning for 
estimation of the magnitude and significance of switching costs without requiring customer-specific data.  
7
 In what follows, we refer to the switching costs across periods as dynamic cross-selling while the cross-selling 
from the provision of loans to OBS is referred to as static contemporaneous cross-selling.  
8
 The assumption is that a given bank and its rivals have the same sensitivity of the transition probability of 
randomly selected borrowers to changes in the interest rate on loans.  
9
 The transition probabilities are assumed to be Markovian. 
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Following the derivation in Kim et al. (2003)
10
, it can be shown that bank i’s market 
share in the lending market at time t follows a law of motion given by
11
: 









 
11
,,,1011,,
n
S
PPaaSa
n
n
tRiti
i
titi                                   (1) 
Where ti ,  denotes the market share of bank i at time t; and 1, ti  refers to time t-1; S is the 
magnitude of switching costs; 1a  is the sensitivity of the transition probability to the bank’s 
interest rate on loans. It is assumed that 01 a  since the higher probability of borrowing 
from bank i is associated with a lower relative interest rate charged by the bank; ia0  is the 
bank-specific intercept, which captures bank heterogeneity; tiP ,  is the interest rate on loans 
charged by the bank ; and tRiP ,,  is the interest rate charged by bank i’s rivals
12
.  
Using a static representation of the familiar Monti-Klein model for bank i, the profit 
of the bank at any point in time can be written as
13
: 
 
    GSLwDGSOLCGSrOPLP DSoL   ,,,,            (2) 
 
Subject to balance sheet identity: L+GS=D, where L refers to the quantity of loans, GS 
denotes the quantity of government securities, and D is the quantity of loanable funds. OPo  
refers to non-interest fee-based income, while O refers to the quantity of fee-based activities 
(i.e. OBS). Sr  is the interest rate on government securities and assumed to be bank-invariant 
                                                          
10
 Kim et al., (2003) theoretical framework indicates that a bank has to decrease its interest rate on loans lower 
enough to compensate for switching costs in order to successfully poach its rivals’ consumers. On the other 
hand, once the bank has successfully poached its rivals’ consumers it can charge an interest rate on loans 
slightly higher than its rivals without losing the consumers, ceteris paribus, due to switching costs.  
11
 The effect of switching cost on the market share of the bank at time t varies with the size of the bank. In 
particular, larger than average banks would benefit from the switching costs since they have a larger consumer 
base to lock in, while smaller than average banks would be worse off because more consumers are locked out.  
12
 As suggested by Kim et al. (2003), equation (1) remains valid where the econometricians observe only a noisy 
version of the prices, such as prices which are unadjusted for output characteristics since the noises can be 
absorbed by the bank-specific intercept.  
13
 Subscripts are omitted for simplicity. 
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and exogenously given. LP  is the interest (price) rate on loans.   wDGSOLC ,,,,  is the non-
interest operating cost. Cost of funds ( )D  and labour costs (w) are assumed to be 
exogenously given in line with the standard banking model. 
From the first-order conditions for profit maximization with respect to the price at any 
point in time, we obtain: 
 
L
O
O
C
O
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L
C
P
L
P
L ODL
L





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



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
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                                                  
i.e.  
 
L
O
MCMRMCMR OOLL


                                                               (3) 
Rearranging (3) we have: 
L
O
MCMC
L
O
MRMR OLOL





                                                     (4) 
 
Equations (3)-(4) indicate that being a multiple-output producer, the bank would use loans as 
loss-leader as long as the loss in revenue of loans can be compensated by the gain in cross-
selling off-balance sheet (OBS) services.  
In a multiple-period setting, the necessary condition for the bank to maximize the 
present value of its life time profit 





 
t
ti
t
iV ,, at any point in time (denoted byτ) by 
setting up the interest rate on loans at time (i.e. ),iP  is 0
,
,
,
,










 


 

t i
tit
i
i
PP
V
.  ,iP  
affects not only the time   profit but also the profits in the subsequent periods. The reason 
for this is that the quantity of loans at any period affects the demand for loans in the period 
that follows and also the demand for loans in the period that follows influences the demand 
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for OBS services contemporarily. Allowing for contemporaneous cross-selling from the 
provision of loans to fee-based non-interest income, the optimal interest rate strategy can be 
expressed as.
14
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Where tiPCm ,  is the spread between the interest rate on loans and the marginal cost of loans 
of bank i, i.e. 
t
Di
i
titi
L
C
PPCm 













 ,,,   and   is the one-period discount factor; 1, ti  
is the market share of loans for bank i at time t+1, ti ,  refers to time t, S indicates the 
magnitude of the switching cost and 1tg  is the  market growth rate for loans at time t+1, and 
n is the number of banks in the lending market. 
Equation (5) captures the relation between the price-cost margin of loans and the 
current market share in the lending market, the market share in the future period and the 
reimbursement from the cross-selling of OBS activities. It accommodates both dynamic and 
contemporaneous cross-selling. Both types of cross-selling induce a smaller price-cost 
margin of loans at time t, ceteris paribus. The first type refers to the inter-temporal supply of 
loans due to switching cost (the first term). The bank believes that the current market share in 
the loan market is valuable for future market share because the bank is able to lock in its 
existing consumers. Hence, the bank sets a lower interest rate on loans in the current period. 
Put differently, the lower interest rate on loans at time t is a loss-leader of the future market 
share in the lending market.  The second type of cross-selling is between loans and OBS 
                                                          
14
 The optimal interest rate strategy given by Kim et al., (2003) only contains the first two components of 
Equation (5) in the case of the presence of switching cost across periods. In our framework, the 
contemporaneous cross-selling is conditional on the quantity of loans demanded at any period, the principal of 
the optimal path of the interest rate on loans as elaborated in Kim et al., (2003) holds.  
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activities contemporaneously (the third term). The bank sets a lower interest rate on loans 
since the bank believes that the demand for loans at time t would lead to the 
contemporaneous demand for OBS services at the same time, which would bring in net 
revenue associated with OBS to compensate for the loss of the revenue in the provision of 
loans. The lower interest rate on loans at time t is a loss-leader of the demand for OBS 
services at time t.   
In the absence of both types of cross-selling, the optimization problem of the bank 
reduces to the conventional case of a one-period oligopoly (i.e. the second term) in the 
lending market. The oligopoly power of the bank, however, is subject to consumers’ 
sensitivity of the transition probability to interest rate on loans (i.e.  <0). 
To link the magnitude of switching cost to the degree of competition in the loan 
market, we model S as a time-varying industry-specific bank-invariant switching cost 
variable: 
tt MCS 00                                             (6)  
where 0C  represents time-invariant psychological elements relating to inertia and tM  is the 
time-varying industry-specific bank-invariant degree of competition in the lending market. 
The sign of 0C  indicates the impact of psychological elements on the magnitude of switching 
cost. The coefficient 0  indicates the impact of the change of competition on the switching 
cost in the lending market; its sign a priori is indeterminate.  On the one hand, the industry 
organization literature tends to suggest that an increase in competition induces a decrease in 
the switching cost, i.e. 00  , and hence reflects increased fragility of long-term 
relationships in a more competitive environment (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  However, the 
“winner’s curse” hypothesis suggests 00   due to the concern of banks to win a “lemon” in 
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a more competitive lending market
15
. Moreover, banks’ endogenous effort to enhance the 
capital value of relationship with borrowers in order to protect the bank-borrower tie in 
competition would also induce a higher switching cost in competition (Elasa, 2005).  
Equation (5) contains a component representing contemporaneous cross-selling. 
Similar to the dynamic cross-selling of loans across multiple periods, the intention of banks 
using loans as a loss- leader to cross-sell OBS activity contemporaneously has to be 
accommodated by the demand side of OBS activities. In what follows, we use the transitional 
probability of loans across periods of time, presented in Kim et al., (2003), to capture 
consumers’ utility maximization.  
We assume there are differences across banks in the quality of fee-based services. 
Consumers value quality. Further, we assume there is an incompatibility cost borne by the 
consumer at time t in the case of switching to another bank in which the consumer does not 
purchase loans at the same period of time; we denote the incompatibility cost as m
16
. 
Thus, the probability of purchasing fee-based services in the same bank which 
provides loans is: 
 
 mqqf tjtitii  ,,, ,Pro                                                                           (7) 
 
tiq ,  is the quality indicator of bank i in providing fee-based services and tjq ,  is the quality 
indicator of the rival bank j in providing fee-based services.  
                                                          
15
 It is hypothesized that “bad” borrowers have more incentive to exploit the “shopping around” freedom among 
banks induced by the increase in competition. This increases the difficulty by banks to distinguish between the 
“good” borrowers, who switch in order to mitigate the “holding-up” problem of the existing lending 
relationship, and the “bad” ones (Northcott, 2004).  
16
 As explained by Farrell and Klemperer (2006), such incompatibility cost is essentially an endogenous 
switching cost. In order to increase the difficulty borne by their consumers to purchase the follow-on products 
from other providers, producers have incentives to manipulate compatibility costs by making their follow-on 
products more compatible with their core product and less compatible with their rivals’ products.  
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The probability of bank i to attract consumers who purchase loans from rival banks to 
purchase OBS services from i is; 
 
 
jt,R,it,it,ij mq,mqfPro                                                                  (8) 
 
jm  is an (n-1) vector of incompatibility costs, in which each of the elements equal to m 
except for j. 
In aggregate, transitions are unobserved. Thus, the formulation of the probability of 
switching to purchase fee-based services from i, even if bank i is not a supplier of loans, 
unconditional on the rival’s identity, is given by: 
 
 













t,KiK
t,j
jt,R,it,iijt,iiR
L
L
mq,mqfPro                                                 (9) 
Where tjL ,  is the quantity of loans of bank j at time t; 
  tKiK
tj
L
L
,
,
 is the probability that a 
randomly selected rival’s consumer is one who purchases loans from bank j. Therefore, the 
demand for OBS activities faced by bank i at time t, induced by selling loans of the bank at 
time t, is
17
: 
 
t,iiRt,R,it,iit,it,i ProLProLO                                                                                   (10) 
 
tiL ,  is bank i’s output of loans at time t, while tRiL ,,  is the rival’s (of bank i) output of loans at 
time t.  
                                                          
17
 Noticeably, the tiO ,  does not represent the total OBS activities provided by bank i; it is the part which is 
relevant to contemporary cross-selling from loans to OBS services. Essentially, it presents a threshold that stops 
the borrowers of bank i from purchasing OBS services from rival banks. 
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Using a first-order linear approximation on the transaction probabilities, we have:  
 
 mqqbPro t,R,jt,i1t,ii                                                                             (11) 








1n
m
qqbPro t,R,jt,i1t,iiR                                                                        (12) 
 
where tRjq ,,  is the average quality of the rivals of bank i.  Similar to Equation (9), Equation 
(12) describes the transition probability of a randomly selected rivals’ customer. We assume 
that the sensitivity of the transition probability to bank i’s quality of services equals to that of 
the rivals of bank i. Substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we have: 
 
   )
1
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,1,,,1,,,11,
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n
L
LmbLLqqbO
tRi
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From (13),  mqqb
L
O
tRjti
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ti



,,,1
,
,
                                         (14) 
 
01 b if customers value the quality of fee-based financial services. In the case where 
incompatibility cost exists, 0m .  We further allow m to be time-varying and bank-invariant 
and model it as a function of the degree of competition in the lending market.     
 
tt Mmm 10                                                                         (15)    
 
0m is assumed to be constant across our sample period, indicating the time-invariant 
incompatibility cost. Such incompatibility cost includes the fixed search cost for a different 
provider of financial services as well as the transaction cost dealing with multiple bank 
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relationship in providing loans and financial services. tM  is the degree of competition in the 
lending market. Equation (14) therefore links the time-variant incompatibility cost to the 
change in the degree of competition in the lending market.  Equation (15) sets up a 
framework to allow us to examine the impact of the change in the degree of competition in 
the loan market on cross-selling from loans to OBS services. The empirical value of 1  has 
implications for the presence of the endogenous lock-in of OBS services, in response to the 
change in the degree of competition in the lending market. If 01  , the bank strategically 
increases the incompatibility cost in order to hold their borrowers’ consumption of OBS 
services induced by the provision of loans once the lending market becomes more 
competitive. Alternatively, 01  suggests that the incompatibility cost faced by consumer 
(i.e. the bank’s ability to cross-sell OBS service from the bank’s perspective) is higher when 
the lending market becomes less competitive. Substituting (15) into (14), gives the extent of 
contemporary cross-selling undertaken by the bank: 
 ttRiti
ti
ti
Mmqqb
L
O
10,,,1
,
, 


                        
Substituting Equation (15), (14) and (6) into (5) yields the first of our estimating equations: 
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Where 
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t
t
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




,      
Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (1) produces the second of our estimating equations:  
 
     BMaBaCPPa ttRitiiti 0110,,,10,                                                         (17) 
Where 1,
11
1




 ti
n
n
n
B  .     
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IV. Data and Variables 
We collect an unbalanced panel of UK bank level data for the period 1993-2008 from 
Bankscope
18
. Since our theoretical models of cross-selling require that sample banks operate 
in the same market, we remove foreign banks and non-conventional banks from our sample.  
Mergers are dealt with by aggregation of the financial statements to create a single composite 
bank for the entire period. Since our theoretical model relies on the assumption that changes 
in the market share of each bank across time imply switching behaviour by borrowers, we 
filter the change in the market share induced by M & A. Industry level data and macro data 
are obtained from Bank of England. Nominal data are deflated by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) using 2005 as the base year. Our estimation of the change in the degree of competition 
in the lending market is obtained from the H-statistic based on the Panzer and Rosse model 
(1987). The sample is split into two parts of equal length (1993-2000 and 2001-2008) and 
allows for the variation of H-statistics across the two sub-periods
19
.  
The test of the H-statistics is based on the properties of a reduced form log-linear revenue 
equation for a panel data set of banks, hence:  
 
 

J
j
K
k
itkitk
J
j
jitjjitj
i
it XwpostwR
1 11
0 lnlnln      (18)   
where R represents the interest income of bank i at time t
20
, the ws are J input prices for each 
bank, the  K X terms are exogenous bank specific variables that affect the bank’s revenue and 
cost functions. The bank-specific intercept i0  captures the heterogeneity across banks and  
                                                          
18
 Our sample starts from 1993  excluding the 1991-1992 recession, we  exclude 2009  because of the low 
availability of the number of observations in Bankscope and the pollution to the data from further mergers and 
the banking crisis. 
19
 Do we have other motivation for such split? 
20
  Interest income includes income on loans and other earning assets, such as government securities.  The above 
definition does not introduce biases into our estimation of competition in the lending market, given in the 
theoretical literature which assumes that competition in  market for other earning assets can be proxied by 
perfect competition. Arguably, such an assumption is more realistic for advanced financial markets such as the 
UK.  
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is a stochastic term. We adopt a two-input factor specification in our empirical application 
(j=1,2): total loanable funds (the sum of deposits and money market funding and other 
funding) and non-interest operating cost (the expenditure associated with labour and physical 
capital). The price for total loanable funds is calculated as the ratio of total interest 
expenditure to total loanable funds, and the price for non-interest operating cost is given by 
the ratio between non-interest operating cost and total assets. We adopt the vector of bank-
specific variables, kitX , that have  been used widely in the literature to estimate the H-
statistic. First, we control for the size effect on gross interest revenue by taking the natural 
logarithm of total assets (LNASSET)
21
. To take into account the influence of revenue 
generation from the provision of OBS services on interest income, we introduce the ratio of 
total operating income over total interest income (REOBS). We include the ratio of financial 
capital over total earning assets to signal the constraint of capital on the supply of credit 
(CAP). Finally, we consider the quality of the loan portfolio, measured by the ratio of total 
loan loss reserves over total gross consumer loans (NPL). The idea is that an increase in 
provisions is a diversion of capital from earnings, which could have a negative effect on 
revenue. Alternatively, a higher level of provisions indicates a more risky loan portfolio and 
therefore a higher level of compensating return. The variable post is a dichotomous dummy 
variable, which takes the value zero for the period 1993-2000 and unity for 2001-2008. The 
H-statistic is calculated from the reduced form revenue equation; it measures the sum of 
elasticities of total revenue of the bank with respect to the bank’s input prices.  In the context 
of Equation (18), 


2
1
1
j
jH  is the degree of competition for 1993-2000, while 
                                                          
21
 We are aware of the caution posed by Bikker et al., (2009) regarding the inclusion of scale variables such as 
total assets in the set of control variables in the revenue equation during the estimation of H-statistics. Bikker et 
al. (2009) argue that total assets proxy for the quantity of outputs. In our case, the focus is on loans, which form 
only a part of total assets. The fact that we control for total assets in our equation does not imply a constant 
quantity of loans, or a constant ratio of loans over total assets.  
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)(
2
1
2 j
j
jH  

is the degree of competition for 2001-2008. Following Olivero, et al. 
(2011), among others, we interpret the magnitude of H as a measure of the degree of 
competition in the loan market, with larger values of H indicating stronger competition.  
 An important feature of the H-statistic is that the tests must be undertaken on 
observations that are in long run equilibrium.  This suggests that competitive capital markets 
will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of 
returns should be uncorrelated with input prices. The equilibrium test is performed by 
recalculating the Rosse-Panzar statistic by replacing total revenue as the dependent variable 
in equation (18) with pre-tax profit to total assets (ROA) and keeping other specifications 
unchanged, as shown in equation (19).  
  
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The long-run equilibrium tests for pre- and post- 2000 are done  using 0
2
1
1 
j
jE   
and 0)(
2
1
'
2 
j
jjE  , respectively. Since our variation of competition in the lending 
market is related to two sub-periods, Equation (16) and (17) are thus restated as Equation (20) 
and (21).  
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                                                                                 (20)   
   tiextRitiiti postBaBaCPPa ,011,,,10,                    (21)  
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Where 
t
t
titim
L
C
PCmMAR


 ,,, , 
i
0 is the composite intercept term. It includes the non-
interest marginal cost of loans at the industry level and bank-specific intercept to catch the 
heterogeneity
22
. Notably, 0mmex  and 0CCex   since exm  and exC  include an additional 
component representing the first sub-period, which is the reference category in our 
examination of competition. ti ,  and ti ,  are the stochastic terms.        
The dependent variable in Equation (20), timMAR ,, , is the difference between the 
interest rate on loans and the interest rate on loanable funds. The interest rate on loanable 
funds is calculated by the ratio of total interest expenditure to total loanable funds as we did 
in Equation (18) and (19). The income statements of the banks do not always separate interest 
revenue between interest earned on loans and interest earned from other earning assets. Thus, 
the ratio of interest received to the sum of loans and other earning assets is a weighted 
average of the average return on loans and the average return on other earning assets (RO).  
Following Matthews et al., (2007), the average interest on loans is calculated by subtracting 
the weighted yearly average of the 3-month interbank rate (RB) from the total interest 
earnings per interest earning asset.
23
  If RB is a good proxy for RO, then the PL will be 
measured with a non-systematic error, which will be absorbed into the general error in the 
regression equation and therefore result in unbiased estimates.           
Turning to the independent variables of Equation (21), we assume that tO, , the 
difference between the marginal revenue and marginal cost of OBS services, is a constant 
                                                          
22
 This is equivalent to the assumption of a linear non-interest cost function.  
23
 The calculated series for the full sample are available from the authors on request. Since we use the 
outstanding stock of net loans which is the difference between gross loans and loan loss reserves, the implicit 
interest rate on loans has been risk-adjusted. 
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coefficient across banks (i.e., a time-invariant and bank-invariant coefficient), and therefore it 
merges with a constant
24
.  
The market growth rate at time t+1, 1tg  
is calculated as the sum of the quantity of 
loans of  our sample of banks at time t+1 divided by the same  at time t and n is the number 
of our sample banks at time t. The discount factor, t , is calculated using the three-month 
interest rate on T-bill in line with Kim et al., (2003). The bank-specific market share at time 
t+1 1, ti  and is given by the quantity of loans of the bank i at time t+1 divided by the sum of 
the quantity of loans of all our sample banks at time t+1. We use the ratio of total operating 
income over total operating cost as the indicator of the overall quality of OBS services ( q ). 
Such choice is mainly motivated by the banking literature using cost-income ratio to measure 
the operational efficiency of banks. The quality of OBS services of bank i’s rival is calculated 
by 


ij
tjtjtRj qsq ,,,, ,   



n
i
ti
tj
tj
L
L
s
1
,
,
, , is the share of each rival bank in terms of total loans 
supplied by the industry as a whole.  The difference in the interest rate on loans between the 
bank i and its rivals in Equation (17b) (i.e. tRiti PP ,,,  ) is calculated in a similar way. Table 1 
presents the definition and measurement of the variables we used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1: The definition and measurement of variables 
Variable name Definition of each variable 
ti ,  The market share of bank i at time t 
tRiti PP .,,   
The difference in the interest rate on loans between the bank i and its 
rivals 
                                                          
24
 Allowing for the variation of tO,  across banks leads us to estimate a random coefficients model, which 
would dramatically increase the difficulty of the estimation. We relax this assumption and proxy tO,  by the 
ratio of non-interest income over non-interest operating cost in our subsequent test for robustness. 
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B 
1,
11
1




ti
n
n
n
  
timMAR ,,  
The difference between the interest rate on loans and the interest rate 
on loanable funds. 
1,1
1


titt
n
n
g   
The product of market growth rate between time t and time t+1 and 
discount factor  and the market share at time t+1 and 
 1n
n
 
N The number of banks at time t 
t  The three-month interest rate on T-bill 
 RB The 3-month interbank rate 
tRiti qq ,,,   The ratio of total operating income over total operating cost 
tiO ,,
  
The ratio of non-interest operating income over non-interest 
operating cost 
ln R  Natural log of the interest income 
lnROA Natural log of pre-tax profit to total assets 
)( ,,1 tiwLn  The ratio of total interest expenditure to total loanable funds 
)( ,,2 tiwLn  The ratio between non-interest operating cost and total assets 
NPL The ratio of total loan loss reserves over total gross consumer loans 
LNASSET Natural log of total assets (deflated) 
REOBS The ratio of total operating income over total interest income 
CAP The ratio of financial capital over total earning assets 
GDPG Real GDP growth rate  
POST 
The bilateral dummy variable, which takes the value 0 for the 
period 1993-2000 and value 1 for 2001-2008. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ti ,  1092 0.014 0.036 0.000 0.256 
tRiti PP ,,,   1092 0.033 0.271 -1.872 5.665 
B 1003 0.000 0.036 -0.243 0.017 
timMAR ,,  1092 0.032 0.269 -2.501 5.566 
1,1
1


titt
n
n
g   
1003 0.084 0.209 0.000 1.381 
N 1092 68.779 5.100 57.000 73.000 
t  1092 4.934 1.298 1.240 7.110 
 RB 1092 5.463 0.996 3.670 7.340 
tRjti qq ,,,   1092 0.236 1.829 -10.771 25.913 
tiO ,,
  
1091 0.703 1.133 -16.158 27.381 
ln R  1092 4.771 2.484 -0.693 10.583 
lnROA 1092 0.182 0.044 0.000 1.365 
)( ,,1 tiwLn  1092 -3.237 0.553 -6.723 0.693 
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)( ,,2 tiwLn  1085 -3.855 1.012 -7.784 -0.630 
NPL 1092 0.027 0.050 0.000 0.457 
LNASSET 1092 7.726 2.575 2.238 14.453 
REOBS 1092 0.902 1.483 -0.142 24.833 
CAP 1092 0.148 0.291 -0.091 6.500 
GDPG 1092 0.035 0.012 -0.007 0.045 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables; there are no abnormal 
patterns reflected in the behaviour of the means and their dispersion. 
V. Estimation and empirical results 
We jointly estimate Equations (18), (19), (20) and (21) using Nonlinear-Three-Stage-Least-
Squares with one-way fixed effects using the LSDV approach
25
. The endogenous variables 
1, ti , ti ,  and the relative interest rate on loans are instrumented by lead and the lag of 
market share up to three years
26
, one time period lag of the relative interest rate on loans, 
ti , t, and the ratio of personal expenditure over  total assets of the bank i relative to its 
rivals
27
.  As a test for robustness, we report the empirical results of four variants of the model in 
Table 3. Model 1 assumes a constant O  across banks and time, and imposes long-run 
equilibrium in the loan market. Model 2 tests for long-run equilibrium in the loan market. 
Model 3 relaxes the assumption of the constant price of OBS services in both time and bank 
dimensions and use a proxy variable, the ratio of non-interest operating income over non-
interest operating cost
28
. This adds a new coefficient to be estimated in equation (20), namely 
( exmb1 ), and also allows us to separately identify 1b (the sensitivity of the transition 
probability to the bank’s quality of OBS services) and exm (the reference incompatibility 
cost). Model 4 imposes the restriction of 0exm . 
 
                                                          
25
 While the majority of the banking literature using H-statistics estimates Equation (18) and (19) separately, the 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence shows the presence of contemporaneous correlation of the residuals of the 
two equations at 1% significant level, suggesting the need for system estimation. 
26
 Kim et al. (2003) also adopt the lead and lag of three years as their instruments motivated by the finding of 
Degryse and van Cayseele (2000)  of a 2.39 year average time length for loans.  
27
 Cost variables are appropriate instruments for output price in both homogeneous and differentiated markets 
(Berry, 1994). It is calculated in the same manner as the relative quality indicator and relative interest rate on 
loans.  
28
 Such treatment is equivalent to assuming the equality between marginal cost (marginal revenue) and average 
cost (average revenue).  
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 Table 3: Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares; No observations = 586; Standard 
Errors in parenthesis 
Variable Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Equation 18: Dependent Variable lnRit 
 
)ln( ,,1 tiw  1  0.556*** 
(0.041 
0.558*** 
(0.041) 
0.557*** 
(0.041) 
0.557*** 
(0.041) 
)ln( ,,2 tiw  2  0.073*** 
(0.027) 
0.074*** 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.027) 
)ln(* ,,,1 tiwpost  1  -.087*** 
(0.019) 
-.087*** 
(0.019) 
-.087*** 
(0.019) 
-.087** 
(0.019) 
)ln(* ,,2 tiwpost  2  0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
tiNPL ,  1  0.338 
(0.221) 
0.339 
(0.221) 
0.357 
(0.221) 
0.336 
(0.221) 
tiLNASSET ,  2  0.924*** 
(0.026) 
0.925*** 
(0.026) 
0.926*** 
(0.026) 
0.926*** 
(0.026) 
tiREOBS ,  3  -.077*** 
(0.011) 
-.077*** 
(0.011) 
-.077*** 
(0.011) 
-.077*** 
(0.011) 
tiCAP ,  4  -.296 
(0.249) 
-.296 
(0.249) 
-.294 
(0.248) 
-.294 
(0.248) 
Equation 19: Dependent Variable lnROAit 
 
)ln( ,,2,,1 titi ww  
*
1  
0.008 
(0.007) 
- - - 
)ln( ,,1 tiw  
'
1  
- 0.039 
(0.035) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
0.039 
(0.035) 
)ln( ,,2 tiw  
'
2  
- 0.001 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
)ln(* ,,2,,1 titi wwpost  
*
1  
0.004 
(0.005) 
- - - 
)ln(* ,,,1 tiwpost  
'
1  
- -.008 
(0.012) 
-.008 
(0.012) 
-.008 
(0.12) 
)ln(* ,,,2 tiwpost  
'
2  
- 0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
tiNPL ,  
'
1  
0.236 
(0.250) 
0.248 
(0.222) 
0.245 
(0.221) 
0.245 
(0.221) 
tiLNASSET ,  
'
2  
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
tiREOBS ,  
'
3  -.001 
(0.001) 
-.003 
(0.002) 
-.003 
(0.002) 
-.003 
(0.002) 
tiCAP ,  
'
4  
0.157 
(0.114) 
0.150* 
(0.091) 
0.153* 
(0.090) 
0.153* 
(0.90) 
Equation (20): Dependent variable: itMAR and equation (21): Dependent variable: it  
 
ti ,  1/ 1a  -15.56*** 
(0.690) 
-16.42*** 
(1.026) 
-15.53*** 
(0.951) 
-15.63*** 
(0.944) 
1,1
1


titt
n
n
g   ex
C  3.220*** 
(0.188) 
3.359*** 
(0.227) 
3.167*** 
(0.210) 
3.189*** 
(0.212) 
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1,1
1
* 

titt
n
n
gpost   0
  1.188*** 
(0.109) 
1.246*** 
(0.123) 
1.177*** 
(0.116) 
1.185*** 
(0.115) 
tRjti qq ,,,   Ob 1  0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
- - 
tiO
P
,
 
exmb1  
- - -.002 
(0.027) 
- 
Post 
1  1.356* 
(0.725) 
1.138* 
(0.633) 
- - 
)(* ,,,,, tRjtitiO qqP   1b  
= = 0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
post*
tiO
P
,
 
1  
= = 3.107 
(2.809) 
3.004* 
(1.841) 
211  H  0.629*** 
(0.042) 
0.631*** 
(0.042) 
0.630*** 
(0.042) 
0.630*** 
(0.042) 
21212  H  0.614*** 
(0.037) 
0.615*** 
(0.037) 
0.614*** 
(0.037) 
0.614*** 
(0.037) 
21  D  -.016** 
(0.008) 
-.016** 
(0.008) 
-.016** 
(0.008) 
-.016** 
(0.008) 
211 ''  E  - 0.039 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
21212 ''''   E  - 0.033 
(0.036) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
exm  
- - -.215 
(3.573) 
- 
Note: The number of observation is different from that in Table 2 due to our employment of instrumental 
variables. The figures in the parentheses are robust-White heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. * indicates 
10% significant level, ** indicates 5% significant level and *** indicates 1% significant level. Bank-specific 
fixed effects are included in the estimation.  
 
Concentrating on the estimates for the H statistic, it can be seen that the unit price of 
funds and non-interest operating cost are both positively related to interest revenue at the 1% 
level, in both periods. The magnitude of the H-statistics for the first sub-period, 1993-2000, is 
0.629 (H1), which is significantly different from zero at 1%. While the magnitude of the H-
statistic for the second sub-period, 2001-2008, is 0.614 (H2), again is statistically significantly 
different from zero at 1%. Therefore, the competition in the UK lending market seems to be 
characterised by monopolistic competition throughout 1993-2008, which is consistent with 
the general finding in previous studies that have used the Rosse-Panzar approach for the 
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UK
29
. The comparison between the magnitude of H1 and H2 suggests that the degree of 
competition in 2001-2008 was lower than in 1993-2000.   
The estimation and testing results for Equations (20) and (21) show that the point 
estimate of α1, the slope of the transition probability function of bank loans, is less than zero. 
Therefore, the higher interest rate charged by banks on loans would trigger the incentive of 
existing borrowers to switch, as required by our theoretical model. The aggregated term of 
time-invariant switching cost in the lending market and that of the period 1993-2000, exC , is 
statistically significant. The significant and positive value of 0  shows a higher switching 
cost in the period 2000-2008 compared with the period 1993-2000, suggesting an increase in 
switching cost in a less competitive lending market.  The estimated coefficient on the relative 
quality indicator of financial services is statistically positive, indicating that banks with 
higher relative efficiency attract more demand for OBS services, in line with the prediction of 
the theoretical model
30
.  Finally, 1  is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
the transition probability for the consumer to purchase OBS service from the bank that is not 
its supplier of credit is lower in the period 2000-2008 compared to the period 1993-2000. 
This finding suggests that contemporaneous cross-selling is more likely when the competition 
in the loan market is less intensive.  
Our results  challenge the conventional view that the increase in competition in the 
lending market leads banks to exercise a “loss-leader strategy” of reducing the interest rate on 
                                                          
29
 For example, Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) find improved competition in the 1980s and 
1990s. Claessens and Laeven (2004) find relatively strong competition during the 1990s, while Casu and 
Girardone (2006) find a relatively low level of competition with an H-statistic of around 0.3. The H-statistics 
estimated by Matthews et al. (2007) for major British banks are in the region of 0.5-0.75.  
30
 The result is based on the assumption that OBS services have higher marginal revenue than marginal cost, i.e. 
0
,

tiO
 . While the current specification does not allow us to distinguish between the sensitivity of transition 
probability of OBS services to the bank’s quality of financial services (i.e 1b ) and the gap between the marginal 
revenue and the marginal cost of OBS services (i.e. 
tiO ,,
 ), our theoretical framework indicates that cross-
selling between loans and OBS services is economically meaningful only if there is a trade-off in revenue 
between loans and OBS services (Equation (3)).  
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loans to attract consumers, and cross-sell other financial products that compensate for the loss 
in interest income on loans. 
Our interpretation of the above evidence is as follows. The intention by consumers to 
purchase the best quality of fee-based OBS service is tempered by the increase in the 
likelihood of the rejection of loans by their supplier of loans in the near future.  Such a 
situation is more likely to become a concern for consumers when the competition in the loan 
market is low and switching costs are high.  The insight that switching costs in the loan 
market and the incompatibility cost of using an alternative provider of OBS services would 
induce banks to charge lower interest rates on loans in a less competitive lending market 
sheds doubt on the reliability of using the traditional interest rate spread to measure the 
degree of competition.  
We test for the robustness of the main results in three ways. First, in Model 2 we 
remove the constraint of long-run equilibrium in the lending market ex ante and the test for 
H-statistics, and test for the presence of long-run equilibrium condition ex post. The results 
show that the equilibrium condition could not be rejected in the sub-periods and the results 
were unaffected.  
Second, to reflect the view that the profitability and revenue of a bank is highly 
sensitive to the business cycle we add a pure time series variable, real GDP growth rate 
(GDPG) to our estimation of the H-statistics (Eq (18)) and the long-run equilibrium condition 
(Eq (19)) in the loan market( results not shown)
31
. However, this variable was not statistically 
significant in each of the model variants and again the main results were unaffected  
 Third, we relax the assumption of the constant O in both time and bank dimensions 
and use a proxy variable, the ratio of non-interest operating income over non-interest 
                                                          
31
 By allowing for the exogenous market growth rate in Equation (20) and (21), the pro-cyclical pattern of the 
overall borrowing activity  has be controlled.  
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operating cost
32
. This adds a new coefficient to be estimated in equation (20), namely 
( exmb1 ), and also allows us to separately identify 1b (the sensitivity of the transition 
probability to the bank’s quality of OBS services) and exm (the reference incompatibility 
cost). Again the results are largely unchanged 
However, the sensitivity of the transitional probability of the bank consumer to the 
quality of OBS services ( 1b ) and the impact of the change in competition in the lending 
market on the incompatibility cost of OBS purchase ( 1 ) lose statistical significance. A 
closer examination shows that the insignificant coefficient, exm , is the main reason for an 
insignificant coefficient on 
tiO ,,
  ( exmb1 )
33
. The coefficient exm  represents the sum of time-
invariant incompatibility cost and the incompatibility cost for 1993-2000. When both 
components are negligible, a zero value is a special case and is consistent with the theoretical 
model. In Model 4 we impose the restriction of 0exm
34
, and re-estimate the model.  
 The restriction of 0exm  does not lead to a discernible statistical difference in the 
estimates. Furthermore, 1  appears to be statistically significantly at the 10%, implying the 
contemporary cross-selling situation only occurs in the less competitive lending market (i.e. 
2001-2008). The coefficient 1b  has the expected positive sign but it is only significant at 13% 
level. However, we view this as prima facie evidence for the argument that the bank 
consumer values the quality of financial services in the purchase of OBS services.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Such treatment is equivalent to assuming the equality between marginal cost (marginal revenue) and average 
cost (average revenue).  
33
 This is judged from the same sign and the similar high p-value (above 0.95).  
34
 This is equivalent to excluding 
tiO ,
  from independent variables in Equation (20).  
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VI. Conclusion 
We have estimated and tested an empirical model of banking behaviour that encompasses 
cross-selling of off-balance sheet services and switching costs in the UK during 1993-2008. 
In general, the estimated parameters of the model conform to our theoretical priors. We 
obtain evidence which suggests that the second half of the sample period saw an increase in 
switching costs between providers of loan products. Also, we find that as a result of 
weakening competition in the loan market in the second half of the sample period, bank 
consumers faced higher costs of switching from their loan provider to an alternative provider.  
In addition, the consumers faced higher costs of purchasing from an alternative provider of 
off-balance sheet services. Contemporaneous cross-selling is therefore greater when 
competition in the loan market is weaker. British banks engage more in cross-selling as a 
means of holding on to their customers by bundling together off-balance sheet services and 
loans when the loan market is less competitive. 
 Our findings challenge the conventional view that banks undertake a loss-leader 
strategy of under-pricing loan products to capture bank customers and cross-sell non-interest 
financial services in competition. However, our research has three shortcomings.  First, the 
model presented here deals with contemporaneous cross-selling and not inter-temporal cross-
selling. It is possible that banks undertake loss-leader strategies in an inter-temporal 
framework as in the traditional customer-loan relationship model. Second, we assume the 
price of other financial services is exogenously given, which can be challenged if the bank 
possesses certain market power in the pricing of OBS. Thirdly, our research employs 
aggregate bank data rather than disaggregated data relating to bank products. Nevertheless, it 
is a first step to modelling cross-selling and switching costs in British banking. While 
signalling the need for more theoretical and empirical work in the area of strategic behaviour 
of banks, the findings of this paper have a strong policy resonance that requires further study. 
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